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Fighting for La Volez Passagera:
Abolition and the Spanish Slave Trade
Jessica Smith
On the morning of September 7, 1830, Lieutenant Edward Harris
Butterfield stood on the deck of the Spanish slave ship La Veloz Passagera.
Butterfield surveyed the scene around him, taking in the carnage that lay at his
feet. He made note of the damage done not only to the crew and cargo of the
slaving brig, but also his own naval vessel, His Majesty’s Ship Primrose. The bloody
battle cost the lives of three members of Primrose’s crew and injured many more
during battle, including the captain. La Veloz Passagera lost forty-six members
of its crew and its captain was injured during the conflict.1 It is clear that the
crew of La Veloz Passagera was attempting to avoid capture by the British Royal
Navy vessel in an effort to prevent the navy from discovering the ship’s illegal
cargo. Lieutenant Butterfield and his crew fought their way onto the slave ship
to search for a sign that the vessel was engaged in the illegal traffic of slaves. Once
1 Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio De Janeiro and Surinam, and
with Foreign Powers on Slave Trade, 1831 (Class A&B), Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII,
576-577.
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on board, they discovered nearly 600 enslaved Africans chained below the ship’s
deck. The ship’s captain, Don Jose Antonio de la Vega, put the lives of his entire
crew and cargo of African captives at risk by choosing to engage in battle instead
of surrendering to Primrose.
La Veloz Passagera was one of thousands of ships that participated in the
largest forced migration in modern history: the Transatlantic Slave Trade. At least
12 million Africans fell victim to the slave trade from 1492 to 1866.2 Powers such
as Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain purchased enslaved Africans on the
coast of Africa and shipped them across the Atlantic and Indian Ocean to be used
as slaves across the globe. Despite the difference in nationality of slave traders, the
brutality with which the powers treated the enslaved Africans aboard their ships
was indistinguishable. According to James Field Stanfield—a sailor on a slave ship
in the 1770s—once aboard slave ships, the crew forced African captives below
the decks where they spent most of the voyage chained not only to the ship but
to each other. When they were allowed onto the deck of the ship, the captives
remained in chains and the ship’s crew would sometimes use the opportunity to
beat enslaved Africans for any minor inadvertencies.3 Despite its brutality, due to
economic dependence on the forced labor of enslaved Africans, the slave trade
flourished for years.
It was not until the late 18th century that European powers spoke out
against the slave trade on a broad scale. In March of 1807, Great Britain, once
one of the Transatlantic Slave Trade’s most prominent supporters, signed the
Abolition Act, effectively outlawing British subjects’ participation in the trade.4
Through the use of the Royal Navy, Britain became one of the most influential
adversaries of the trade. Britain deployed its Royal Navy in conjunction with
treaties signed with other world powers in an attempt to bring the slave trade to
2 Toby Green, A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 267.
3 Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 149.
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an end. These treaties gave the British Royal Navy the right to search and seize
ships suspected of engaging in the trade.
Through the examination of La Veloz Passagera’s case and Spanish
involvement in the slave trade from the late 1700s to mid 1800s, this paper will
argue that, following the opening of the slave trade in Spain, Spanish slavers
were more concerned with financial prosperity than they were the safety of their
captives and crew. As the bustling plantation economy of the Spanish Empire
grew, Spanish slave traders favored quantity of captives over quality of life on their
ships in effort to bring as many captives as possible back to Spanish ports. The
story of La Veloz Passagera reveals the horrors of the slave trade and demonstrates
how Spanish slave traders were poised and ready to attack British Royal Navy
vessels set on taking their cargo. This paper also examines the mistreatment
of African captives during their time aboard slave ships and after liberation.
Although abolitionists envisioned freeing enslaved Africans and resettling them
in freetowns, the towns that “freed” Africans were forced to live in were far from
picturesque.
Today, one might describe the slave trade as notorious due to the utter
disregard for the wellbeing of Africans throughout this period. However, the
notoriety attached to the slave trade is something that developed over time and
may not have been present at the time. There is, however, the case of one Spanish
slave ship that stood out, even during the time of the slave trade. Alexander
Findlay, the Lieutenant Governor of Sierra Leone calls it, in a letter to his
Britannic Majesty, “the notorious Spanish slave ship Veloz Passagera.”5
The Capture of La Veloz Passagera
On August 21, 1828, the Spanish slave brig La Veloz Passagera sat
anchored on the coast of Havana, Cuba, furnished with papers claiming a

5 Alexander Findlay & W. Smith to His Majesty (18 Oct. 1830), The National Archives of the
U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19, 134-136.
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commercial voyage to the coast of Africa.6 The ship’s crew consisted of four
officers and roughly 108 mariners that boarded the ship at Havana. Armed with
guns and a hefty crew, La Veloz Passagera set sail on August 25. The captain and
owner of the ship, Don Jose Antonio de la Vega, later joined his crew when they
arrived in Cadiz, Spain. According to a crew member, Alexandro Nocetty, the
ship sailed under Spanish colors, but they had “French and American colors on
board” if they needed to deceive other vessels.7 La Veloz Passagera and its crew
arrived on the coast of Africa three months after its departure from Havana on
the November 7, 1828. On November 19, she embarked at Whydah and spent
time between the coast and the Portuguese islands for two years before setting sail
back to Havana on September 4, 1830.8 The ship left the coast of Africa having
picked up 556 Africans set to be sold at Havana.9
As La Veloz Passagera began its voyage back to Havana, the British Royal
Navy ship Primrose was sailing to Badagry, Nigeria. At around five o’clock in the
evening on September 6, 1830, Lieutenant Edward Harris Butterfield spotted
the slave vessel off the coast while on his ship, Primrose.10 The Primrose sailed
after La Veloz Passagera, unable to catch up with the ship until eleven o’clock that
same day. William Broughton, commander of the Primrose, fired two shots in an
effort to hail the slave vessel before sending Lieutenant Butterfield to search the
vessel. According to the Lieutenant, upon boarding the vessel, the crew seemed
prepared to fight with guns on board the ship aimed directly at the Primrose.
Lieutenant Butterfield explained to the captain and crew of La Veloz Passagera
that he intended to search their vessel to which the captain declined. Despite
Lieutenant Butterfield’s insistence on searching the vessel, the captain refused his
6 The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19,134-136.
7 Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 576-577.
8 Sierra Leone (Spain and Holland): Commissioners Evan, Smith, Findlay and Fraser (18 Oct.
1830), The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), FO 84/104, 154-158.
9 “Spanish Ship La Veloz Passagera - Register of Slaves” (1830), The National Archives of the
U.K. (TNA), FO 315/33, 33-47.
10 Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 578-581.
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requests and Butterfield returned to the Primrose to report the captain’s resistance
to a search.11
The Primrose remained with La Veloz Passagera through the night
without incident until six o’clock the following morning. At this time, Commander
William Broughton of the Primrose hailed the slave ship once again to allow a
search of their vessel, informing the brig that they had five minutes to send or
receive a boat, or he would begin fire. Five minutes passed. Captain Broughton
put his hand to his hat, signaling his crew to fire a broadside at La Veloz Passagera.
It is unclear who fired first, but Lieutenant Butterfield claims that shots were fired
simultaneously, beginning the bloody conflict between the two vessels. According
to George Bentham, a midshipman on the Primrose, Commander Broughton
ordered the crew to board the slave vessel after the exchange of broadsides.
Bentham claimed that La Veloz Passagera, being taller than the Primrose, gave the
slave ship’s crew a tactical advantage that allowed them to hold off the Primrose
crew’s advances for some time. It took nearly an hour for the Primrose’s crew to
take hold of La Veloz Passagera.12
In that hour, as many as 52 crew members aboard La Veloz Passagera
were killed.13 Five male captives stationed at the vessel’s guns during the conflict
lost their lives, another was badly wounded.14 On board the Primrose, surgeon
Alexander Lane tended to twelve wounded crew members. The injured included
Commander Broughton who, according to other crew members’ accounts,
was wounded by a boarding pike thrown from the Veloz Passagera just after the
broadsides were fired. The Primrose also lost three of its crew during the conflict:
marines John Allen and William Bunker and seaman James Graham.15
Once La Veloz Passagera was successfully captured, it was taken to Sierra
11
12
13
14
15

Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 578-581.
Ibid.
Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 548.
The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19, 134-136.
Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 578-581.
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Leone by Primrose where its case would be tried in the British and Spanish Court
of Mixed Commission.16 The vessel arrived at Sierra Leone on October 8, 1830,
and the case went to trial just a week later on October 16. Sixteen of the enslaved
Africans on board died on the voyage to Sierra Leone and five more passed in the
time between their arrival and the trial. The court convicted La Veloz Passagera
as engaging in the illegal trafficking of slaves, in violation of the Treaty between
Spain and Britain. At this time, the court also emancipated the surviving enslaved
Africans from the vessel. Of the 556 enslaved Africans originally boarded on the
vessel, only 529 survived to emancipation. The 205 men, 54 women, 145 boys,
and 125 girls who survived were to be employed as servants and free laborers in
Sierra Leone.17
The Slave Trade in Ouidah
La Veloz Passagera received its human cargo in the Bight of Benin located
off the coast of West Africa along what the English referred to as the “Slave
Coast.”18 The Slave Coast was a primary place of purchase for transatlantic slave
traders. Located just east of the Gold Coast, the Slave Coast consisted of about
eight trading ports that mainly focused on the trade of enslaved Africans but
also provided traders with the opportunity to exchange goods such as beads, gun
power, and alcohol. According to the first mate of La Veloz Passagera, Alexandro
Nocetty, the entirety of the vessel’s human cargo was shipped from a port on the
Slave Coast known as Jakin. The gunner of the vessel, Juan Bermudez, specified
that the captain purchased the cargo from the Chacha and shipped it from a shore
near Ouidah, presumably Jakin.19 This specification is significant to where the
16 Sierra Leone (Spain and Holland): Commissioners Evan, Smith, Findlay and Fraser (18 Oct.
1830), The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), FO 84/104, 149.
17 Thomas Stilwell & Sons to Treasury (7 Jan. 1831), The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA),
HCA 35/19, pp. 115-116; Shee to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary (10 Feb. 1831), The National
Archives of the U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19, 139-142.
18 Luis Nicolau Pares and Richard Vernon, The Formation of Candomble: Vodun History and
Ritual in Brazil (University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 5.
19 Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 576-577.
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captain of La Veloz Passagera purchased the cargo, due to the role that the Chacha
played on the Slave Coast.
The Chacha was a Brazilian trader named Felix de Souza who was
considered to be one of the key slave traders in Ouidah. The specific duties of the
Chacha are disputed, but it seems that, until the 1840s, the Chacha essentially
monopolized the slave trade in Ouidah, and was considered to be a sort of liaison
between the King at the time and European traders.20 Felix de Souza was given the
title of Chacha around 1818 and, although monopolizing the slave trade may not
have been in his job description, began to dominate the trade at Ouidah.21 Chacha
de Souza held his position during the time that La Veloz Passagera was obtaining
their captives. Juan Bermudez’s claim that the cargo was purchased from Chacha
suggests that La Veloz Passagera bought the enslaved Africans at Ouidah and
dispatched them from the port of Jakin nearby. The distinction between place of
purchase and place of shipment may seem insignificant, however, this distinction
is a key factory in comprehending what the slave trade was like in the area which
La Veloz Passagera’s cargo was purchased.
By the mid-eighteenth century, both Jakin and Ouidah were a part of the
kingdom of Dahomey.22 Dahomey conquered Jakin in 1724 and Ouidah just three
years later in 1727, allowing the kingdom to take control of trade at both ports.23
However, in 1732, Dahomey destroyed the port of Jakin in response to rumors
of a rebellion. Subsequently, Ouidah became the primary center for Dahomey’s
engagement in the slave trade, and, by the late 17th century, Ouidah became the

20 Pares and Vernon, 32-33.; Robin Law, “Royal Monopoly and Private Enterprise in the
Atlantic Trade: The Case of Dahomey,” The Journal of African History 18, no. 4 (1977): 555-577.
21 Law, “Royal Monopoly,” 555-577.
22 J. Cameron Monroe, “Urbanism on West Africa’s Slave Coast: Archaeology Sheds New Light
on Cities in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade,” American Scientist 99, no. 5 (2011): 402.
23 Robin Law, “Slave-Raiders and Middlemen, Monopolists and Free-Traders: The Supply of
Slaves for the Atlantic Trade in Dahomey,” The Journal of African History 30, no. 1 (1989): 50.
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center of the slave trade along the Slave Coast.24 Ouidah was the second largest
exporting city in terms of volume and importance during the Transatlantic Slave
Trade next to Luanda.25 According to historian Robin Law, by the late 1690s,
“as many as 50 [slave] ships in a year, and [was] capable of supplying 1,000 slaves
every month” visted Ouidah.26 The port was of vital importance to the English,
French, and Portuguese, who had established permanent forts in the town for
better access to trading. Despite the forts being occupied by these three nations
during the bulk of the transatlantic slave trade, when the slave trade was outlawed
in 1807 the forts were abandoned, but Ouidah’s participation in the trade did not
cease. Ouidah continued to be the main source of slave exports for both Brazil
and the Spanish colony Cuba.27
Slavery in Spain, 1780-1807
Before the 1790s, the slave trade to the Spanish colonies essentially
remained closed to Spanish subjects. Only private, authorized groups were
allowed to organize expeditions to purchase Africans and have them brought to
the Spanish colonies. There were also restrictions placed on foreign participation
in the slave trade to the colonies.28 Prior to 1790, the slave trade to the Spanish
colonies was centralized in major port cities like Havana. These areas utilized
enslaved African labor to a greater extent than the surrounding areas. African
labor helped Havana grow into a major shipping port for a myriad of commodities,
including enslaved Africans.29 1789 marked the first year of the open slave trade in

24 Law, “Royal Monopoly,” 559; Robin Law, “Dahomey and the Slave Trade: Reflections on the
Historiography of the Rise of Dahomey,” The Journal of African History 27, no. 2 (1986): 240.
25 Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, Matt D. Childs, and James Sidbury, The Black Urban Atlantic in the
Age of the Slave Trade (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 42.
26 Law, “Dahomey and the Slave Trade,” 240.
27 Canizares-Esguerra, Childs, and Sidbury, 43-44.
28 Joseph M. Fradera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Slavery and Antislavery in Spain’s
Atlantic Empire (Berghahn Books, 2013), 34.
29 Herbert S. Klein, The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 209-210.
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Spain with the introduction of a Royal Cedula on February 28.30 The Cedula, also
known as the free slave trade law, allowed any subject of Spain to participate in
the slave trade to the colonies, giving them permission to outfit voyages on their
own terms to the Slave Coast.31
The opening of the slave trade to the Spanish colonies allowed an influx
of Africans to be brought into the colonies, most notably, Cuba. Theresa A.
Singleton claims in her article on slavery in relation to Cuban coffee plantations
that from the time the trade opened in 1790 to the official end of the trade in
1867, 780,000 enslaved Africans were brought into Cuba.32 Many of the Africans
brought to Cuba were used to cultivate sugar and coffee plantations that supported
the Cuban economy. The profits involved in the production of these crops kept
the need for African labor high, and it seems that Spanish subjects were eager to
be involved in the trade. As the price for slaves continued to drop and Spaniards
became more eager to participate in the lucrative trade, Cuba became the largest
slaveholding colony in Spain. At the time of La Veloz Passagera’s voyage, sugar was
produced at a higher rate than any other plantation crop.33
Slavery in the Spanish Empire, 1807-1867
While Cuba’s sugar economies were continuing to grow, Great Britain
was heading towards the abolition of the slave trade. After their own declaration
of abolition in 1807, they pressured other powers to sign treaties to end the slave
trade. This was no simple task for the British Government, especially when it came
to dealing with Spain. Britain’s Abolition Act of 1807 came at a time in which
Spanish economies relied on the supply of African labor, and less than twenty
years after the Royal Cedula opened the slave trade to Spanish subjects. Spain was
30 Fradera and Schmidt-Nowara, 34.
31 D. R. Murray, “Statistics of the Slave Trade to Cuba, 1790-1867,” Journal of Latin American
Studies 3, no. 2 (1971): 132.
32 Theresa A. Singleton, “Slavery and Spatial Dialects on Cuban Coffee Plantations,” World
Archaeology 33, no. 1 (2001): 1.
33 Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 333.
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not ready to give up participation in the trade because the lack of continuously
supplied labor may have affected the prosperity of the growing sugar plantations.
Spain officials publicly agreed with Britain in 1815 that the slave trade was
inhumane but would not agree to the abolition of the trade until two years later.34
In Madrid on September 23, Spain and Britain signed a joint treaty for
the abolition of the slave trade. The treaty declared that the Spanish government
would cooperate with Great Britain by “adopting in concert with His said
Majesty, efficacious means for bringing about the abolition of the slave trade;
for effectually suppressing illicit traffic in slaves, on the part of their respective
subjects.”35 The treaty went on to solidify that beginning May 30, 1820 it would
be illegal for Spanish subjects to “purchase slaves, or to carry on the slave trade on
any part of the coast of Africa.”36 The 1817 treaty included clauses specifying that
the treaty only outlawed participation in the slave trade North of the equator, and
that the British Royal Navy had the right to search Spanish vessels, but could only
detain them if slaves were actually found on board.37
The 1817 Spain-Britain treaty meant that Spanish subjects had only three
years left to participate in the trade legally. Author Ada Ferrer argues that this
time crunch did not slow the importation of Africans to Cuba but rather caused
Spanish slave traders to move faster in an attempt to purchase as many enslaved
Africans as possible in those three years. According to Ferrer, from 1817 to 1820
Cuba’s imports were higher than they had ever been previously. It seems that
during this time slave traders exchanged safety for speed. Although conditions on
board slave ships for a standard voyage were a far cry from livable, the conditions
became even worse during this three-year period. The traders favored the quantity
34 Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending of the Slave Trade (New York: Africana Publishing
Company), 11.
35 Lewis Hertslet, A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, vol. 2, (London, 1820),
273-295.
36 Ibid.
37 Hertslet.
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of slaves over quality of life as they pushed past the capacities of their ships to
force as many Africans on board as possible.38 During this three-year period,
slave traders allowed for ship conditions to worsen in order to bring as many
captives as they could to Spain before the navy began enforcing the abolition
treaty. Even after the slave trade was officially outlawed in 1820, the slave trade to
Cuba continued to grow. In his article, D.R. Murray draws on the statistics of the
slave trade to Cuba to claim that about half of the Africans brought to Cuba over
the entire history of its involvement in the trade, were brought after slavery had
been outlawed in Spain, from 1821 to 1867.39 Despite the daunting quantity of
these figures, the British Royal Navy was able to seize some of the Spanish vessels
illegally engaged in the slave trade.
La Veloz Passagera’s Crew
While the captain and crew of a captured slaving vessel often suffered
few to no consequences, this was not the case for the crew of La Veloz Passagera.
As a result of the conflict on September 7, 1830 between the slave vessel and the
HMS Primrose, three crew members of the Primrose lost their lives. The conflict
took place due to the Veloz Passagera’s refusal to allow a search of their ship: a
violation of the 1817 Spanish-British treaty. Therefore, in the eyes of the British
government, the crew of La Veloz Passagera was responsible for the deaths of the
crew members aboard the Primrose.
The morning of September 7, 1830—the day the Primrose captured La
Veloz Passagera—24 of the slave ship’s crew were arrested for the murders of the
navy vessel's crew members John Allen, James Graham, and William Bunker.40
The 24 men were taken prisoner and sent to England from Sierra Leone, where
they were imprisoned on board the Culedonia at Plymouth.41 The men were not,
38 Ada Ferrer, “Cuban Slavery and Atlantic Antislavery,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 31,
no. 3 (2008): 267-295.
39 Murray, “Statistics on the Slave Trade,” 149.
40 The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), FO 84/104, 151.
41 Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 547.
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however, tried in a British court. Instead, they were sent to Spain, the defendants'
home country, to stand trial under Spanish laws for the murders. British officials
concerned in the matter trusted Spanish officials to handle the trial due to the
nature of the case. Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Alexander Findlay and W.M.
Smith believed that the Spanish government would “not fail to inflict full penalty
of the law of Spain upon those men.”42 At the time, similar cases to that of La
Veloz Passagera were happening among Spanish vessels engaged in the trade.
Findlay and Smith argued in a letter to Viscount Palmerston that because of
the frequency of these cases “an example is required to be made, to operate as a
warning,” to other Spanish vessels.43
This aspect of La Veloz Passagera’s story demonstrates how invested in
the slave trade Spanish slave traders were. Spanish slave traders were so desperate
to bring enslaved Africans back to Cuba to support plantations that they engaged
in battles with British Royal Navy ships. The reactions of Findlay and Smith
illuminate that La Veloz Passagera was not an isolated incident. They had clearly
seen other cases of Spanish vessels resisting capture by the Royal Navy. While
perhaps not to the brutal extent of La Veloz Passagera, cases of slave ships resisting
capture happened with enough frequency that the governments needed to send
a strong message. By the 1820s, Cuba was one of the world’s leading producers of
sugar and, as demonstrated by La Veloz Passagera, they would not allow the threat
of the Royal Navy to prevent them from participating in the trade. Resistance to
the British campaign for abolition, however, was not unique to Spain and began
at the start of the campaign.
British Antislavery and the HMS Primrose
Great Britain’s Abolition Act of 1807 was the beginning of a century
long campaign against the slave trade. Prior to 1807 British abolitionists began
voicing outrage toward the slave trade and the inhumanity of its methods. In part,
42 Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, XLVII, 572.
43 Ibid.

62

pressure from abolitionists helped push Britain to outlaw British participation in
the trade.
Once Britain outlawed the slave trade for their own subjects, they set
their sights on persuading other world powers to join their campaign against
the trade. Their efforts were met with resistance on multiple fronts. The goal for
Britain was to get countries to sign a treaty agreeing to the abolition of the slave
trade and allowing the Royal Navy to enforce the treaty at sea. The first issue was
persuading countries to agree to the gradual abolition of the trade. Countries like
Spain and Brazil thrived from the labor of enslaved Africans on their plantations
and were reluctant to give up their ability to engage in the trade. Even after
convincing powers to agree to abolition, a second issue arose when it came to the
Royal Navy’s right of search and seizure
Britain wanted to mobilize its Royal Navy to subdue the slave trade to
any country that signed a bilateral abolition treaty. Britain recognized that a treaty
was not enough to effectively abolish the slave trade and that the power of the
Royal Navy was needed to patrol the Slave Coast to present a larger obstacle for
those engaged in the illegal traffic of slaves.44 However, countries were skeptical
of Britain’s motivations for mobilizing the Royal Navy. Britain wanted to give
its Royal Navy the power to board ships in search of slaves, essentially allowing
the Royal Navy to board any ship hoisting the flag of a country who had signed
a treaty of abolition.45 World powers were wary of allowing the British Navy to
board their ships at leisure. The Royal Navy boarding ships had already been a
source of outrage for Spain. Before the Spanish government illegalized the slave
trade in 1820, countries which had already outlawed slavery hoisted Spanish flags
to engage in the trade without suspicion. The British government quickly caught
on and began to search and seize any vessel flying a Spanish flag to prevent this
44 Maeve Ryan, “The Price of Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention: Britain, the Right
of Search, and the Abolition of the West African Slave Trade, 1807-1867,” in Humanitarian
Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2011): 238.
45 Mason, “Keeping Up Appearances,” 813.

63

practice.46 By 1830, Britain overcame these challenges and persuaded powers such
as Spain, Brazil, and Portugal to sign treaties agreeing to the abolition of the slave
trade and allowing the Royal Navy the right to search and seize ships engaged in
the trade.47
Once Britain negotiated treaties for abolition, the problem became
enforcing these treaties at sea. It was all too easy for slave traders to find ways to
participate in the trade illegally and pressure was on the Royal Navy to capture
slave ships along the West Coast of Africa. However, the agility of slave ships put
the Royal Navy squadron at a disadvantage. According to historians Peter Grindal
and Adam Lambert, the vessels outfitted in the beginning years of the trade
lacked “the sailing qualities to compete with swift and agile slaving schooners,”
specifically those headed for Cuba.48 Navy vessels also faced a disadvantage until
the 1830s, as they could only seize slave vessels if they had slaves on board. Thus,
even if British Royal Navy officers boarded a ship and found it to be outfitted with
the proper equipment to engage in the trade, they could not detain the vessel. In
some cases, this caveat led to incidents of suspected slave vessels throwing captives
overboard to avoid punishment. With the introduction of the equipment clauses
in the 1830s, slave ships could be detained without slaves on board if they were
outfitted with the proper equipment and provisions for a slave voyage.49
His Majesty’s Ship Primrose commanded by Commodore Collier,
was one of the Royal Navy vessels patrolling the coast in the early years of the
campaign against the slave trade, but it was not known for making significant
arrests on the coast. Ships like HMS Sybille and Black Joke, also commanded

46 Ada Ferrer, “Cuban Slavery and Atlantic Antislavery,” 149.
47 Mary Wills, Envoys of Abolition: British Naval Officers and the Campaign Against the Slave
Trade (Liverpool University Press, 2019), 19.
48 Peter Grindal and Andrew Lambert, Opposing the Slavers: The Royal Navy’s Campaign Against
the Atlantic Slave Trade (I.B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2016), 328-383.
49 Ibid, 233-282.
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by Commodore Collier, frequently overshadowed Primrose.50 HMS Primrose
found some success on the Windward Coast prior to 1830, but its biggest success
capture was La Veloz Passagera. Originally, Primrose was not expected to capture
the slave ship. Prior to its capture, La Veloz Passagera had been spotted at Ouidah
along with eight other Spanish ships by Commodore Collier in June of 1829. At
the time, Collier was captaining HMS Sybille and planned not to leave the coast
until he had captured La Veloz Passagera. However, an epidemic that broke out
on the ship caused Sybille to leave the port and La Veloz Passagera was unable
to be captured. Nearly a year had passed before La Veloz Passagera was spotted
again. During this time, the Primrose pursued but was unable to capture several
large slave ships. La Veloz Passagera was once again spotted at the coast of Ouidah
in June and the commander of Black Joke waited patiently to intercept the vessel.
However, on September 3, just four days before the capture of La Veloz Passagera,
the commander had to return home and the slave vessel was intercepted by
Primrose.51
Liberated Africans in Sierra Leone
After capturing La Veloz Passagera, HMS Primrose brought the vessel’s
surviving crew and cargo to Sierra Leone to be brought to trial under the British
and Spanish Mixed Commission Court.52 The successful capture of a slave ship
did not mean that the enslaved Africans on board were now necessarily out of
harm’s way. They still had to make the voyage back to Sierra Leone or a similar
freetown and await emancipation. The period from capture to condemnation
of the ship was not a speedy process, and over the course of this time Africans
on board the slave vessels did lose their lives waiting for emancipation. In the
case of La Veloz Passagera, 21 Africans died between the time of capture and
50 Grindal and Lambert, 328-383; Commodore Collier was the commander of a squadron of
Royal Navy ships on the West Coast of Africa including HMS Sybille, Clinker, and the famous
Black Joke.
51 Ibid, 328-383.
52 The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19, 115-116.
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emancipation, leaving 529 of the original 556 emancipated at Sierra Leone.53
British abolitionists envisioned Sierra Leone as a place for emancipated
Africans to live together whilst growing accustomed to life free of slavery. Between
1808 and 1863, navy vessels brought roughly 99,000 Africans to Sierra Leone.54
However, liberated Africans were not given the choice of where they wished to
relocate. Africans were forced to live in the freetown of the British government's
choosing. British officials at Sierra Leone also governed liberated Africans by their
own whims and ideals. Despite the population consisting mainly of Africans,
European culture dominated Sierra Leone. Africans became accustomed to the
religious practices and ways of living that were comfortable to Europeans, much
like the experiences of Africans who completed the voyage across the Middle
Passage.
Although Africans at Sierra Leone had not completed their journey
across the Middle Passage, they still lived with the traumas that came with being
transported on a slave vessel. At the time of the slave ship’s capture, they had already
experienced long hours confined below deck, mistreatment from the crew of the
ship, and many other horrors that came with being on a slave vessel. Even after the
slave vessel’s capture, many Africans remained on board in the same conditions
during the voyage back to Sierra Leone. If they surived the journey, Africans found
themselves forced into a way of life in Sierra Leone. David Northrup explains that
“faced similar cultural challenges in recreating themselves, if under less traumatic
circumstances than in the Americas.”55
Some liberated Africans were forced to apprentice or enlist, while
others were shipped off to other British colonies to support the need for labor.56
53 The National Archives of the U.K. (TNA), HCA 35/19, 115-116.
54 Richard Anderson, “The Diaspora of Sierra Leone’s Liberated Africans: Enlistment, Forced
Migration, and “Liberation” at Freetown, 1808-1863,” African Economic History 41 (2013): 101.
55 Canizares-Esguerra, Childs, and Sidbury, 24.
56 Jake Christopher Richards, “Anti-Slave-Trade Law, ‘Liberated Africans’ and the State in the
South Atlantic World, c.1839-1852,” Past and Present 241, no. 1, (2018): 197.
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In some cases, those tasked with laboring at Sierra Leone were paid miniscule
wages, but most African laborers worked as free laborers, growing crops like
sugar and cotton much like those enslaved. Local colonial authority in Sierra
Leone used Africans to support the village system and help maintain the colony’s
infrastructure. According to historian Padraic Scanlan, the Africans were tasked
with clearing forests to allow the villages to expand into the nearby mountains.57
Liberated Africans helped cultivate villages at their own expense. The Liberated
African Department moved Africans into the housing structures they built and
left them to maintain their homes and find a way to survive with little to no
government support. The Liberated African Department also used the village
system to make it easier to exploit liberated Africans as unskilled laborers.58 The
colonial government in Sierra Leone operated under the guise of freedom and
emancipation when, in reality, it undermined liberated Africans as sources of
labor and forced them to assimilate to British culture.
Conclusion
The story of the capture of Spanish slave ship La Veloz Passagera lays the
foundation for understanding the treatment of African captives from the time
of the ship's capture to their experience in Sierra Leone. Demonstrating how
Spanish slave traders chose to engage with British Royal Navy vessels in combat,
the actions of La Veloz Passagera’s crew demonstrate how Spanish slave traders
were more concerned with financial prosperity than they were with the lives of
those aboard their ships. Even after the Spain-Britain treaty abolishing the slave
trade in Spain, Spanish slave traders found ways to bring thousands of captives
back to Spain to work on sugar and coffee plantations. In fact, conditions on slave
ships worsened after the abolition of the slave trade. While abolitionists’ efforts
were valiant, emancipation did not mean true freedom for African captives.
57 Padraic X. Scanlan, “The Colonial Rebirth of British Anti-Slavery: The Liberated African
Villages of Sierra Leone, 1815-1824,” The American Historical Review 121 (2016): 1097.
58 Ibid, 1099.
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Liberated Africans endured similar labor and conditions to those who made it
across the Middle Passage.
On the morning of September 7, 1830, La Veloz Passagera put roughly
700 lives in danger by choosing to go to battle with Primrose rather than
surrendering their cargo. This decision demonstrates not only the importance of
the slave trade in Spain but also the lengths that Spanish slavers were willing to
go to participate in the trade. From the beginning of open trade to the year of
the trade’s abolition in Spain, Spanish slave traders rushed to bring a multitude
of Africans to the Spanish colonies. For the captain of La Veloz Passagera, the
potential reward that would come from bringing 556 slaves to Cuba was of more
importance than the lives of his own crew. Captain Don Jose Antonio de la Vega’s
decision cost him his cargo of Africans and the lives of nearly half of his crew.
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